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Abstract 
This paper examines the growth and income distribution effects of inflation in a growing economy with heterogeneous 
households and progressive income taxation. Assuming that the cash-in-advance constraint applies to investment as 
well as to consumption spending, we show that a higher growth of monetary supply yields a negative impact on 
growth and an ambiguous effect on income distribution. Numerical example with plausible parameter values, however, 
demonstrate that those long-run effects of money growth are rather small. In contrast, fiscal distortion caused by 
progressive taxation yield significant impacts on growth and distribution.
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     1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine interactions between money growth
and real income tax in a simple model of monetary endogenous growth with
heterogeneous agents. We construct a cash-in-advance model in which there
are two types of households, each of which has diﬀerent time discount rate.
In our setting, the long-run level of relative income and the balanced growth
rate of real income are uniquely determined unless the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution in consumption is suﬃciently high. Provided that the
cash-in-advanced constraint applies to both consumption and to investment
spending, we inspect how a change in the growth rate of nominal money
supply aﬀects growth and income distribution in the long-run equilibrium.
We show that a monetary expansion has a negative impact on growth and
an ambiguous eﬀect on income distribution.1 Numerical example with plau-
sible parameter values, however, demonstrate that the quantitative eﬀects of
money growth are rather small. In contrast, the ﬁscal distortion caused by
progressive taxation may yield considerable impacts on growth and distrib-
ution.
2 The Model
Consider a competitive, growing economy with an Ak technology. The ag-
gregate production function is given by
y = Ak, (1)
where y is output and k is capital stock. Since the production employs
capital alone, the competitive gross rate of return to capital is determined
by r = A. As for the consumers’ side, we assume that there are two types of
households. Those type of agents diﬀer in the time discount rates and initial
1Several authors examine the growth eﬀect of inﬂation in the context of representative-
agent models of endogenous growth: see, for example, De Gregorio (1993), Jha, Wang
and Yip (2002), Jones and Manuelli (1995), Marquis and Reﬀett (1995) and Mino (1997).
In general, the foregoing studies ﬁnd a negative relation between growth and inﬂation.
The present paper reexamines the same issue in a prototype model of endogenous model
with heterogeneous agents. It is to be noted that the steady-state impact on inﬂation in
exogenous growth models have produced more diverse results. For example, Chen et al.
(2008) reveal that a rise in money growth may or may not increase the steady-state level of
capital depending on whether or not the marginal impatience increases with consumption.
1holdings of wealth. We assume that type 1 household is more impatient than
those of type 2. There is a continuum of households and the total number is
normalized to unity. It is assumed that population share of type 1 is θ ∈ (0,1)
and type 2 is 1 − θ.
Except for the presence of heterogeneous households, the rest of the set-
ting is standard. We use a cash-in-advance model in which households face
a liquidity constraint for their investment as well as for consumption expen-










−ρitdt, σ > 0, ρi > 0,i =1 ,2,
where ci denotes consumption of type i household. By our assumption, the
time discount rate ρi satisfy that ρ1 > ρ2.
The households hold capital and money. The real money balances held








yi − ci − vi − πmi + z, ξ > 0, ε > 0, (2)
where yi,m i, and vi are respectively denote income, real money holding
and investment for physical capital. Additionally, π stands for the rate of
inﬂation and z denotes the lump-sum transfer from the government. We
assume that the government levies progressive income tax and the rate of tax





, where ε (> 1) represents the degree of progressiveness
o ft a x a t i o n .W eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h et o t a lp o p u l a t i o ni so n e ,i m p l y i n gt h a t
y also represents the average per-capita output so that y = θy1 +( 1− θ)y2.
Since we deal with a growing economy with persistent expansion of individual
income, we assume that the rate of tax depends on the relative income rather
than the absolute level of income. This formulation follows Guo and Lansing
(1998) and Li and Sarte (2004).2 The holding of capital stock changes in the
following manner:
˙ ki = vi − δki, 0 < δ < 1, (3)
where ki is capital stock of type i agent and δ denotes the rate of depreciation.
By deﬁnition, the aggregate capital is expressed as k = θk1 +( 1− θ)k2. In
2See also Sarte (1997).
2addition to (2)and (3), the household’s spending is subject to the cash-in-
advance constraint such that
ci + φvi ≤ mi, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. (4)
When φ > 0, the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the investment spend-
ing as well.
The household maximizes Ui subject to (2), (3) , (4) and the initial
holdings of real money balances and capital stock. Since households earn
capital income alone, yi = rki = Aki. As a result, the relative income in the
tax function is expressed as yi/y = ki/k.3 Considering this fact, we set up
the Hamiltonian function for the household’s optimization problem in such













Aki − ci − vi − πmi + z
¾
+ηi (vi − δki)+λi (mi − ci − φvi),
where qi and ηi respectively denote the shadow values of real money balances
and λi is a Lagrangian multiplier. It is to be noted that when selecting
optimal consumption-saving plan, the household takes future sequences of
the average income at the society at large, y, the rate of inﬂation, π, and




i = qi + λi, (5)
−qi + ηi − φλi =0 , (6)
˙ qi = qi (ρi + π) − λi, (7)
˙ ηi =( ρi + δ)ηi − qi
µ






λi (mi − ci − φvi)=0 , λi > 0 and mi − ci − φvi > 0, (9)
lim
t→∞qi (t)mi (t)e
−ρit =0 ; l i m
t→∞ηi (t)ki (t)e
−ρit =0 . (10)
Here, (9) presents the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the cash-in-advance con-
straint and equations in (10) are the transversality conditions.
3In the standard neoclassical growth model, the individual income share is a nonlinear
funcion of individual as well as aggregate caoital and labor. The Ak structure of our model
drastically simpliﬁes the analysis.
3Finally, we assume that the monetary authority keeps the growth rate of
nominal money stock at a positive constant rate, μ, a n db o t ht h et a xr e v e n u e
and the newly issued money are distributed back to each households as a
transfer. Hence, the government’s ﬂow budget constraint is z = θτ (y1/y)y1+
(1 − θ)τ (y2/y)y2 + μm, where m = θm1 +( 1− θ)m2.
3 Balanced-Growth Characterization
In the following we focus on the balanced-growth equilibrium where consump-
tion, capital and real money holding of each household grow at a common,









= g, i =1 ,2. (11)
for all t ≥ 0, where g denotes the balanced growth rate. Given those con-
ditions, it is easy to conﬁrm that the shadow values in the each household






= γ,i =1 ,2. (12)














is held in the balanced-growth equilibrium.
We now denote: xi = ηi/qi and κi = ki/k. Then on the balanced-growth




(xi − 1) − ρi − π i =1 ,2. (14)




[1 − ξ(1 + ε)(κi)
ε]A − ρi − δ,i =1 ,2. (15)
4Notice that the real money balances grow at the rate of g so that π = μ − g
holds on the balanced-growth path. Thus (14) gives
xi = φ[(σ − 1)g + ρi + μ]+1 ,i =1 ,2. (16)
Using (15) and (16), we obtain the following:4
(σg + ρi + δ){φ[(σ − 1)g + ρi + μ]+1 } = A[1 − ξ(1 + ε)(κi)
ε],i =1 ,2.
(17)
By deﬁnition, it holds that
θκ1 +( 1− θ)κ2 =1 . (18)
Equations (17) and (18) may determine the steady state level of relative
capital holdings (relative income), κ1 and κ2, and the balanced-growth rate,
g.
4 Growth and Distributional Eﬀects of Inﬂa-
tion
I ft h et i m ed i s c o u n tr a t ei si d e n t i c a l(ρ1 = ρ2), the balanced-growth condi-
tions reduce to those established in the representative-agent economy. In
fact, if ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ, then (17) and (18) indicate that κ =1 . As a result, the
balanced-growth rate is determined by
(σg + ρ + δ){φ[(σ − 1)g + ρ + μ]+1 } = A[1 − ξ(1 + ε)]. (19)
In this case it is easy to conﬁrm that if φ > 0 and σ ≥ 1, the balanced-growth
rate satisfying (19) is uniquely given and a rise in money growth rate, μ,
depresses g.5 In addition, if σ < 1, then there may exist dual balanced-growth
paths. In this case a rise in μ increases the growth rate of the higher-growth
steady state, while it decreases the growth rate of the steady state with a
lower growth rate.
4We oﬀer the detailed derivation of (19) upon request.
5If there are two balanced-growth paths, one with a higher growth rate is locally in-
determinate and the other with a lower growth rate is locally determinate. See Chen
and Guo (2008), Meng (2002), Jha, Wang and Yip (2002), and Suen and Yip (2005) for
detailed discussion on the representative-agent Ak growth models with cash-in-advance
constraint.
5If there is no cash constraint on investment (φ =0 ), equation (17) reduces
to
σg + ρi + δ = A[1 − ξ(1 + ε)(κi)
ε],i =1 ,2
and thus the growth rate of money supply will not aﬀect the long-run growth
and distribution.
When ρ1 > ρ2 and φ > 0, we can also conﬁrm that there may exist dual
balanced-growth paths if σ < 1. In what follows, we assume that σ ≥ 1 to
focus on the case of unique balanced growth equilibrium. When σ ≥ 1 the
left-hand sides in (17) monotonically increases with g. We also see that the
right-hand side of (17) is a strictly increasing function of κi. Hence, in view of
(18), if the balanced-growth path exists, it must be unique. In this case it is
easy to show that a rise in the money growth rate, μ, depresses the balanced-
growth rate, that is, a higher inﬂation tax has a negative impact on growth
in our two-class economy as well. It is also seen that the eﬀect of inﬂation
tax on income distribution on the balanced-growth path is ambiguous.
In order to inspect growth and distributional eﬀects of inﬂation more
clearly, we now assume that the utility function is logarithmic (σ =1 ). Then




1 − ξ(1 + ε)
µ
1







1 − ξ(1 + ε)
µ
κ
θ +( 1− θ)κ
¶ε¸
− ρ2, (20)
where κ = κ2/κ1 (= k2/k1). The left-hand side of (20) monotonically in-
creases with κ, while the right-hand side monotonically decreases with κ. In










Therefore, there exists a unique positive level of κ satisfying (20) and thus
the balanced-growth path is uniquely given. As before, it is easy to show
that a rise in the money growth rate, μ, lowers the balanced-growth rate.
On the other hand, the eﬀect of a change in the money growth rate on the
long-run level of relative income, κ, depends on the parameter magnitudes
involved in (20).
6We present some numerical examples. The benchmark parameter values
concerning the real side of the economy are the following:
A =0 .12, ρ1 =0 .04, ρ2 =0 .03, ξ =0 .17, ε =0 .6,
φ =0 .2, δ =0 .04, θ =0 .5.
The magnitudes of A,ξ,ε and δ are basically follow those used by by Li and
Sarte (2004).6 Table 1 (a) shows the benchmark case using the parameter
values displayed above. We change the growth rate of money, μ, from 0.02 up
to 0.20. The table indicates that a rise in inﬂation tax depresses the long-run
growth rate and increases the relative income share of the household with a
lower time discount rate.
Panels (b) and (c) set φ =0 .5 and 1.0, respectively (the other parameters
are the same as those given above.). A rise in φ means that the cash-in-
advance constraint for investment becomes tighter. This directly reduces the
long-run growth rate of income, while it increases the relative income share
of type 2 households. In panel (d) we lower ε from 0.6 to 0.4. A decline in the
progressiveness of income tax raises both the balanced-growth rate and the
income share of type 2 households. Panel (e) displays the case where the time
d i s c o u n tr a t eo ft y p e2h o u s e h o l di s0 . 0 2i n s t e a do f0 . 0 3 .T h i ss m a l li n c r e a s e
in preference divergence produces a considerable change in the long-run levels
of relative income. Finally, Table (f) treats the case where ρ1 = ρ2 =0 .03,


















0.15 1.933 − 0.0009
0.20 1.984 − 0.0039
(a) Bench mark (b) φ =0 .5 (c) φ =1 .0
6We set the values of ξ, ε and δ that are slightly diﬀerent from those used by Li and




















(d) ε =0 .4 (e) ρ1 =0 .04, ρ2 =0 .02 (f) ρ1 = ρ2 =
0.03, φ =0 .5
Our numerical exercises reveal that a monetary expansion have a negative
impact on long-run growth rate of income and a positive impact on the rela-
tive income share of the agents with a lower time discount rate. It is shown
that although the degree of cash constraint for investment (the level of φ)
has a relatively large eﬀects on growth, the quantitative eﬀect of a change in
money growth (so the long-run inﬂation) is considerably small.7 In contrast,
the degree of heterogeneity of households (diﬀerence in time discount rates)
and the progressiveness of income tax may produce much larger impacts on
growth and distribution. However, it is needless to add that our ﬁnding de-
pends on a speciﬁcm o d e l l i n go fi n ﬂation, growth and distribution. Further
investigations based on more general formulations would be relevant.
5R e m a r k s
This paper addresses the relation between inﬂation and long-term growth in
an endogenously growing economy with heterogeneous agents. The source
of heterogeneity in our model is the diﬀerence in the time preference. We
have assumed that there are two types of households each of which has a
speciﬁcally ﬁxed rate of time preference. As Chen et al. (2008) demonstrate,
the real impact of inﬂation would be modiﬁe di ft h et i m ed i s c o u n tr a t ei s
endogenous. It would be interesting to see how our ﬁndings are modiﬁed if
the rate of time preference of each household is endogenously determined.
As well as in the most of the existing literature on money and endoge-
nous growth, our numerical examples show that a higher monetary expansion
7As claimed by Temple (2000), the empirical investigations on inﬂation and growth have
not reach a consensus. Many studies, however, indicate that the relation between inﬂation
and growth is relatively weak in countries with moderate inﬂation: see, for example,
Barro (1996). Our numerical examples conﬁrm this ﬁnding even in the presence of income
distributional eﬀect of inﬂation.
8reduces the balanced-growth rate of real income. Recent empirical investiga-
t i o n ss u c ha sE s p i n o z ae ta l .( 2 0 1 0 )r e v e a l e dt h a tt h e r ew o u l db eat h r e s h o l d
level of inﬂation under which a monetary expansion may accelerate growth,
while a higher inﬂation depresses growth when the rate of inﬂation exceeds
the threshold level. To capture such a non-monotonic relation between in-
ﬂation and growth, we should extend the baseline model. Introducing en-
dogenous time discount rates and endogenous labor supply would be useful
for that purpose. We intend to pursue these lines of extensions in our future
research.
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